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1 Introduction
Imagine a remote village with two bakeries baking breads that are close substitutes in the
eyes of the villagers. If this was a ‘Cournot market’, then both bakers would decide how much
bread to bake and bring to the marketplace. An auctioneer would be waiting there to set
the price in such a way that market demand equals the total amount offered. If, instead, this
was a ‘Bertrand market’, then each bakery would set its selling price and wait for customers.
After the realization of demand, both would be obliged to bake exactly the amount of bread
their clients were asking for. A glance at reality shows, however, that such a bread market is
neither a Cournot nor a Bertrand market.1 It is not a Cournot market as bakeries commonly
choose their own prices, but it is not a Bertrand market either as it is usually up to the bakers
to decide how much bread to make. More generally, in free-market societies there typically is
no law telling firms how much to supply and what price to charge.2
A natural assumption in theories of oligopoly would therefore be that firms choose both their
price and quantity of output. The foundation for this type of analysis is due to Francis
Edgeworth (1922, 1925).3 He recognized that price-setting oligopolists may be unable or
unwilling to meet their demand. For example, an undertaking might not be able to generate
sufficient supplies when there is a shortage and it is already producing at capacity. Similarly,
it can be de facto capacity-constrained when production precedes sales and cannot be boosted
instantly. Also, even when a firm has the ability, it will lack the will to satisfy all its customers
when demand exceeds its ‘competitive supply’.4 As is well-known, the disturbing conclusion
of Edgeworth’s explorations was that oligopoly prices are essentially indeterminate. In more
modern language, we would say that no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists. This non-
existence problem received much attention ever since and has been demonstrated in a variety
of settings where firms compete in prices and quantities.
It is often conjectured that the non-existence problem is, at least in part, driven by the
frequently used ‘homogeneous goods assumption’ as it gives rise to discontinuities in demand.
In fact, Edgeworth himself hypothesized the degree of indeterminateness to diminish with
an increase in product differentiation.5 Assuming imperfect substitutes does, however, not
generally yield a solution. Price-quantity games with heterogeneous products have been
studied by Shapley and Shubik (1969), Alger (1979), Friedman (1988), Benassy (1989) and
1For a detailed discussion of classical models of oligopoly, see Vives (1999).
2Evidently, there may be regulated markets, but these are the exception rather than the rule.
3The original version of his 1925-paper dates back to 1897.
4This may occur when firms’ cost functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Edgeworth (1922) studies
the case of quadratic costs, whereas capacity constraints are considered in Edgeworth (1925).
5See Edgeworth (1925, p. 121).
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Canoy (1996). Under a variety of cost and demand conditions, all establish that the problem
of non-existence remains for industries with a few firms selling sufficiently close substitutes.
In this paper, we re-examine price-quantity competition in oligopolies.6 Specifically, our
purpose is to shed light on the non-existence problem by presenting conditions under which
a pure-strategy equilibrium does exist. We consider price-quantity games with continuous
as well as discontinuous demand in terms of the own prices. The first is characteristic for
differentiated goods, whereas the second applies to perfect substitutes. For both cases, we
provide a broad and natural class of price-quantity games with a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Additionally, we are able to characterize these equilibria. With differentiated products, the
equilibrium is shown to be similar to that of a basic Bertrand model. Moreover, and contrary
to previous findings, its existence need not directly depend on the number of firms or the
degree of differentiation. With discontinuous demand, equilibria come in two types. First,
there is a range of rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market
demand. This result is surprising as it has long been argued that the competitive outcome
would be the only equilibrium candidate.7 Although we do find that firms in equilibrium
price at marginal costs, these prices are typically too low to ensure saturation of the market.
Second, there may again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price-only model.
Therefore, our analysis additionally provides some foundation for Bertrand price models.
The non-existence problem pertains to pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Mixed-strategy equi-
libria have been repeatedly shown to exist under a variety of assumptions.8 Mixed equilibria
are, however, problematic within this context for at least two reasons. Perhaps the most
prominent problem is simply that it is at odds with reality. Indeed, butchers, brewers or
bakers typically do not roll dice to determine their prices or quantities of output. This is
especially cumbersome when considering repeated interaction among firms.9 Another issue
is that models of oligopoly become significantly more complicated when allowing for random
6Regarding price-quantity models, it is not uncommon in the literature to distinguish between, on the
one hand, ‘production to order’ or ‘Bertrand-Edgeworth competition’ and, on the other hand, ‘production in
advance’ (see, e.g., Shubik (1955, 1960), Maskin (1986) or Tasna´di (2004)). In case of the former, production
takes place after the realization of demand, whereas in case of the latter production precedes sales. All results
derived in this paper apply equally well to both cases.
7See the pioneering works of Shubik (1955, 1960) and, in particular, Theorem 2 in Shubik (1960, p. 100).
8See, among others, Levitan and Shubik (1972), Dixon (1984), Gertner (1986), Maskin (1986) and Tasna´di
(2004).
9In this regard, Friedman (1988, p. 608) stated that:
“. . . a deep understanding of oligopolistic behavior cannot be achieved by means of single-
period models with results that are unreasonable in a multiperiod setting. This article is intended
as a prelude to the study of dynamic models. Mixed strategies, under which prices and outputs
are randomly selected in each period, seem bizarre in an infinite-horizon oligopoly.”
3
strategies. In particular, it is often difficult to provide an explicit characterization of mixed-
strategy equilibria. As such, this concept is of limited use in applied research on oligopolistic
industries.
The next section gives a general outline of the model and offers some preliminary insights
that serve as a basis for the ensuing study. The main analysis and results are presented in
Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 considers price-quantity competition with continuous demand,
whereas the discontinuous demand case is described in Section 4. A few illustrative examples
are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 A Model of Price-Quantity Competition
In this section, we lay out the basics of our price-quantity oligopoly model. It is assumed
there are n ≥ 2 profit-maximizing firms where the set of firms is N = {1, . . . , n}. Each firm
i ∈ N simultaneously picks a price-quantity pair (pi, qi), with pi ≥ 0 and qi ≥ 0. Let the
vector of prices and quantities be respectively given by p = (p1, . . . , pn) and q = (q1, . . . , qn).
Moreover, p−i = (pj)j 6=i and q−i = (qj)j 6=i. Given the price-quantity choices of competitors,
demand for the products of firm i is denoted Di(pi, p−i, q−i). Firm i’s cost of production is
given by Ci(qi), which is a strictly increasing continuous function of its own output qi and
Ci(0) = 0. Both the demand and cost structure will be further specified below.
The firm’s objective is then to pick a profit-maximizing price-quantity pair:
max
pi,qi
Πi(p, q) = pi · si(p, q)− Ci(qi), ∀i ∈ N, (1)
where si(p, q) denotes firm i’s sales. It is clear that a firm cannot offer more than it produces
and cannot sell more than is demanded. Therefore, sales equals the minimum of production
and demand:10
si(p, q) = min {qi, Di(pi, p−i, q−i)} .
A price-quantity pair (pi, qi) is firm i’s best response to (p−i, q−i) when for each choice (p˜i, q˜i)
it holds that
Πi(pi, qi, p−i, q−i) ≥ Πi(p˜i, q˜i, p−i, q−i).
The above specifications are sufficient to show the following useful result stating that none of
the firms find it optimal to produce in excess of demand.
10Note that, due to the profit-maximizing assumption, firms bring all produced quantities to the market.
Additionally, they will not produce more than the profit-maximizing output at the price set. This condition,
albeit more general, therefore effectively coincides with the voluntary-trading constraint in standard Bertrand-
Edgeworth settings.
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Lemma 1. For each firm i ∈ N , all strategies (pi, qi) for which qi > Di(p, q−i) are strictly
dominated.
Proof Suppose that (pi, qi) is a best response of firm i to (p−i, q−i) and suppose further that
qi > Di(p, q−i). Since si = min{qi, Di(p, q−i)}, it holds that si = Di(p, q−i). Now define
q˜i =
qi +Di(p, q−i)
2
.
As Ci is continuous and strictly increasing, it follows that Ci(qi) > Ci(q˜i). Combining with
si = Di(p, q−i), this implies
Πi(pi, qi, p−i, q−i) < Πi(pi, q˜i, p−i, q−i),
which contradicts the assumption of (pi, qi) being a best response. 
In light of the purpose of this study, we restrict ourselves in the following to pure-strategy
Nash equilibria. A vector of choices (p, q) is an equilibrium when for all i ∈ N and each choice
(p˜i, q˜i) it holds that
Πi(pi, qi, p−i, q−i) ≥ Πi(p˜i, q˜i, p−i, q−i).
Lemma 1 excludes the possibility that in equilibrium a firm operates above its demand curve.
As will become clear in the ensuing analysis, and depending on the specifics of the model,
the two other types of outcome might occur in equilibrium. Akin to the Bertrand model, all
firms may choose to meet their demand at the price set. Alternatively, one or more firms may
find it optimal to satisfy only part of their customers. To indicate these possibilities, we will
use the following definitions:
• An equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is a Bertrand equilibrium when qi = Di(p, q−i) for all i ∈ N .
• An equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is a rationing equilibrium when qi ≤ Di(p, q−i) for all i ∈ N and
qj < Dj(p, q−j) for at least one firm j.
3 Price-Quantity Competition with Continuous Demand
Let us begin by considering price-quantity competition with differentiated products. If goods
are less than perfect substitutes, firms typically do not lose their entire clientele when setting
their price just above that of the competition. In a similar vein, slightly undercutting rivals’
prices is unlikely to yield the market. To capture this idea that ‘small changes should have
small effects’, it is natural to think of demand as a continuous function of prices. Hotelling
(1929, p. 44) formulated this as follows:
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“...a discontinuity, like a vacuum, is abhorred by nature. More typical of real
situations is the case in which the quantity sold by each merchant is a continuous
function of two variables, his own price and his competitor’s. Quite commonly, a
tiny increase in price by one seller will send only a few customers to the other.”
To formalize, suppose there exists a function Ei such that Di(p, q−i) = max{Ei(p, q−i), 0}.
We start by making the following assumptions on demand and cost.
For all (p−i, q−i) and i ∈ N :
A1 Ei is continuous and strictly decreasing in pi.
A2 ∃ε, η > 0 such that ∀qi ∈ (0, η), Ci(qi)qi < ε and Di(ε, p−i, q−i) > 0.
A1 reflects the law of demand for firm i’s product, whereas A2 ensures that firms have an
incentive to be productive. Because both price and quantity are decision variables, it is in
principle possible that production and demand do not coincide. It follows from Lemma 1,
however, that overproduction will not occur in equilibrium. As the next result shows, the
properties A1 and A2 are sufficient to show that, in equilibrium, shortages will not occur
either.
Lemma 2. Under A1-A2, all equilibria are Bertrand equilibria.
Proof Suppose that (pi, qi) is a best reply of firm i to (p−i, q−i). For an equilibrium to be
a Bertrand equilibrium it must hold that qi = Di(p, q−i) for all i ∈ N . By Lemma 1, we
know that qi > Di(p, q−i) cannot occur in equilibrium. Therefore, it remains to be shown
that qi < Di(p, q−i) cannot occur either. Towards that end, we assume qi < Di(p, q−i) and
derive a contradiction.
First, note that all strategies with qi = 0 are strictly dominated. By A2, there exists a price
p˜i > 0 such that Di(p˜i, p−i, q−i) > 0. Given this price p˜i, and again by A2, there exists a
q˜i > 0 such that
Ci(q˜i)
q˜i
< p˜i. Thus, Πi(p˜i, q˜i, p−i, q−i) > 0, whereas all strategies with qi = 0
yield zero profit. We conclude that qi = 0 cannot occur in equilibrium.
Next, suppose that 0 < qi < Di(p, q−i). By A1, there exists a ε > 0 such that for p˜i = pi + ε
it still holds that qi < Di(p˜i, p−i, q−i). However, this implies
Πi(p˜i, qi, p−i, q−i) = p˜i · qi − Ci(qi) > pi · qi − Ci(qi) = Πi(pi, qi, p−i, q−i),
which contradicts (pi, qi) being a best reply of firm i to (p−i, q−i). We conclude that in equi-
librium it must hold that qi = Di(p, q−i), for all i ∈ N . 
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Thus, firms have a strict preference for price-quantity pairs on their demand curve; a finding
that appears to be very robust. Indeed, it has repeatedly been found to hold under a variety of
mild conditions.11 Though this result greatly reduces the number of equilibrium candidates, it
is commonly taken as a basis for establishing non-existence of an equilibrium. In contrast, we
will use it as a foundation for proving existence. Together with assumption A2, the following
three conditions are shown to be sufficient.
For all (p−i, q−i) and i ∈ N :
B1 Ei is continuously differentiable and strictly decreasing in pi. Moreover, ∃ξ > 0 such
that ∂Ei∂pi ≤ −ξ < 0.
B2 ∃K > 0 such that ∑
i∈N
Di(p, q−i) ≤ K.
B3 At all qi > 0, Ci(qi) is continuously differentiable and C
′
i(qi) is non-decreasing.
B1 is similar to A1, but adds the requirement that Ei is differentiable with respect to the
own price and that this derivative is bounded away from zero. B2 states that market demand
is bounded and B3 imposes some structure on production technologies. Specifically, the cost
functions are assumed to exhibit constant or decreasing returns to scale.
Theorem 3. Under A2 and B1-B3, there exists at least one equilibrium.
Proof By Lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium each firm i ∈ N will pick a price-quantity
pair on its demand curve. Thus, for a given vector (p−i, q−i), a best reply (p∗i , q
∗
i ) of firm i to
(p−i, q−i) satisfies q∗i = Di(p
∗
i , p−i, q−i). It follows that (p
∗
i , q
∗
i ) is a best response to (p−i, q−i)
precisely when p∗i maximizes
Ri(pi) := pi ·Di(pi, p−i, q−i)− Ci(Di(pi, p−i, q−i))
and q∗i = Di(p
∗
i , p−i, q−i). Using this fact, we now proceed in three steps to prove existence
of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
Step 1. We show that there is a unique price p∗i > 0 that maximizes Ri.
To begin, notice that pi = 0 does not maximize Ri(pi). By A2, there exists a p˜i > 0 such that
Di(p˜i, p−i, q−i) > 0. Therefore, Di = Ei and a price that maximizes Ri is strictly positive,
equating marginal revenue with marginal cost:
Ei + pi · ∂Ei
∂pi
− dCi
dqi
· ∂Ei
∂pi
= 0.
11See, for instance, Alger (1979, Theorem 3.1), Friedman (1988, Lemma 3), Benassy (1989, Theorem 1) and
Canoy (1996, Lemma 1). In the context of an evolutionary model, Khan and Peeters (2015) have recently
shown that this outcome may also result from firms imitating the most profitable producer.
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Rearranging gives
Ei =
∂Ei
∂pi
·
[
dCi
dqi
− pi
]
. (2)
We now compare the LHS of (2) with the RHS. Define Ai(pi) = Ei(pi, p−i, q−i). By B1 and
A2, we know that Ai(0) > 0. Moreover, by B1 we know that Ai is strictly decreasing and
Ai(pi) ≤ Ei(0, p−i, q−i)− ξ · pi.
We now analyze the RHS of (2). Define
Fi(pi) =
∂Ei
∂pi
·
[
dCi
dqi
(Ei(pi, p−i, q−i))− pi
]
.
Let us first have a closer look at the part between square brackets.
Bi(pi) =
dCi
dqi
(Ei(pi, p−i, q−i))− pi
Since Ei is strictly decreasing in pi by B1 and costs are weakly convex by B3, it follows that
pi 7→ dCi
dqi
(Ei(pi, p−i, q−i))
is strictly positive and non-increasing. Consequently, there is a unique pmi > 0 with
dCi
dqi
(Ei(p
m
i , p−i, q−i)) = p
m
i .
Next, note that the function Bi(pi) is negative and strictly decreasing for pi > p
m
i . Thus, as
∂Ei
∂pi
is negative and strictly decreasing by B1, Fi is positive and strictly increasing for pi > p
m
i .
Furthermore, Fi(p
m
i ) = 0.
Finally, combining the observations on Ai and Fi, there is a unique p
∗
i > p
m
i > 0 with
Ai(p
∗
i ) = Fi(p
∗
i ). Since
dRi
dpi
= Ai − Fi, dRidpi (p∗i ) = 0. Moreover,
dRi
dpi
(pi) > 0 for pi < p
∗
i and
dRi
dpi
(pi) < 0 for pi > p
∗
i . We conclude that p
∗
i is the unique maximizer of Ri.
For each firm i ∈ N and a given choice vector (p, q), we can now define fi(p, q) := p∗i . Before
proceeding, let us define a function H : R2n+ → R2n+ for each choice vector (p, q) ∈ R2n+ :
H(p, q) = (f1(p, q), . . . , fn(p, q), D1(p, q−1), . . . , Dn(p, q−n)) .
Step 2. We show that there is a point (p∗, q∗) with H(p∗, q∗) = (p∗, q∗).
By A2 and B2, we know that Ei(0, p−i, q−i) ≤ K. Using B1, it follows that
Ei(pi, p−i, q−i) ≤ K + ξ · pi.
Therefore, 0 ≤ p∗i ≤ −Kξ and, following B2, 0 ≤ Di(pi, p−i, q−i) ≤ K.
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Define M = max{K,−Kξ }. Then, for any choice vector (p, q), ‖H(p, q)‖ ≤
√
2n ·M . Next,
we argue that H is continuous. Notice that fi(p, q) := p
∗
i is the unique maximizer of
Ri(pi) := pi ·Di(pi, p−i, q−i)− Ci(Di(pi, p−i, q−i)).
Because both Di and Ci are continuous, the maximum principle implies continuity of fi. As
the demand of each rival is also continuous, H is continuous. By the Brouwer Fixed Point
Theorem, we then know there is a point (p∗, q∗) with H(p∗, q∗) = (p∗, q∗).
Step 3. We show that (p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium.
Since p∗i = fi(p
∗, q∗), p∗i maximizes the function
Ri(pi) := pi ·Di(pi, p∗−i, q∗−i)− Ci(Di(pi, p∗−i, q∗−i)).
Moreover, q∗i = Di(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i). Thus, (p
∗
i , q
∗
i ) is a best reply to (p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i). As this holds for
each firm i ∈ N , (p∗, q∗) is an equilibrium. 
This finding somehow generalizes the results of Benassy (1989). Under the assumption of
symmetry, he established that (i) for a given number of firms, there does not exist an equi-
librium when the degree of substitutability between heterogeneous goods is sufficiently high,
and (ii) for a given level of imperfect substitutability, there does exist an equilibrium pro-
vided that the number of undertakings is sufficiently large.12 Theorem 3 not only allows for
asymmetry, but also admits demand curves to be ‘very flat’ independent of market size. In
particular, an equilibrium may also exist when a small number of sellers produce close but
imperfect substitutes.
The analysis in this section thus reveals that a broad and natural class of price-quantity games
with differentiated products has an equilibrium in pure strategies. This class is ‘broad and
natural’ in the sense that many well-known oligopoly models meet the required assumptions.
A few examples are presented in Section 5 of this paper. Moreover, all equilibria exhibit
Bertrand behavior. Indeed, even though sellers have no obligation to satisfy the demand
forthcoming to them, they are happy to do so.
4 Price-Quantity Competition with Discontinuous Demand
Let us now direct our attention to price-quantity competition under the assumption that
demand is discontinuous in price. Such a discontinuity property is characteristic of industries
12The first finding has been confirmed by Canoy (1996), whereas the second conclusion can also be found in
Shapley and Shubik (1969).
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with undifferentiated products. Though arguably not as realistic as the continuous demand
case, this case is of interest because it plays an important role in classical theories of oligopoly
and remains popular today.
We start with some preliminaries. As we consider undifferentiated products, customers first
buy from the cheapest firm(s). In what follows, we use P = min{p1, . . . , pn} to denote the
lowest price in the industry and L = {i | pi = P} to indicate the collection of sellers charging
P .
In general, the demand of each firm comprises direct and indirect demand. One implication
of the homogeneous goods assumption is that a firm faces direct demand only when there is
no cheaper supplier in the market. Let total direct demand be given by D(P ) ≥ 0, which
is continuous and strictly decreasing in P as long as D(P ) > 0. It is further assumed that
D(0) > 0. Under the simplifying assumption that the market is split evenly in case of identical
prices, direct demand Ddi for each firm i ∈ N is then defined as follows:
Ddi (p) =
{
1
|L| ·D(P ) if i ∈ L
0 otherwise.
Each seller may additionally experience indirect or spillover demand. This might occur when
one or more firms in L do not satisfy their (direct) demand and these unserved customers
still plan to purchase the product or service from another supplier. This indirect demand
is denoted by Dsi (p, q−i), for all i ∈ N . Rather than providing a detailed description of the
contingent demand structure, we suppose that Dsi (p, q−i) ≤ α · D(pi) with α ∈ [0, 1]. That
is, spillover demand of firm i at price pi is at most a fraction α of the total demand at
that price. Thus, the degree of spillover is captured by the parameter α, where α = 1 and
α = 0 respectively reflect the case of complete spillover and the case where indirect demand
is absent. Total demand for the products of firm i is therefore given by
Di(p, q−i) = Ddi (p) +D
s
i (p, q−i),∀i ∈ N. (3)
Let us now first consider the case where unserved customers may visit higher-priced firms.
In line with most of the existing literature, we begin by showing conditions under which
an equilibrium does not exist. Then, we will provide sufficient conditions under which an
equilibrium does exist. Specifically, we will show that there are rationing equilibria when
spillover demand is not too strong.
We make the following assumptions on cost and demand. In stating these assumptions, define
Zi(p−i, q−i)(pi) = Di(pi, p−i, q−i) as the residual demand of firm i.
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For all i ∈ N :
C1 If qi ≥ Di(p, q−i), and p′i < pi, then for every j 6= i with pj ≥ pi, Di(p′i, p−i, q−i) ≥
Di(p, q−i)+Dj(p, q−j). If qi ≤ Di(p, q−i), then for every j 6= i with pj > pi, Di(p, q−i)−
qi ≥ Dj(p, q−j).
C2 Zi(p−i, q−i)(p′i) ≤ Zi(p−i, q−i)(pi) for all p′i > pi.
C3 For all (p, q), Zi(p−i, q−i)(0) > 0. We also assume that for all (p, q) with p > 0 there is
p′i > 0 with Zi(p−i, q−i)(p
′
i) > 0.
C4 Let (p, q) be such that qj ≤ Dj(p, q−j) for all j. Then there is an ε > 0 and K > 0 such
that for every i and p′i with pi < p
′
i < pi + ε it holds that
Zi(p−i, q−i)(p′i) ≥ Zi(p−i, q−i)(pi)−K · (p′i − pi).
As an easy consequence, also using that Zi(p−i, q−i) is not increasing, at such a point
(p, q) the function Zi(p−i, q−i) is right-continuous at pi.
C5 Ci(qi) is continuously differentiable with C
′
i(0) = 0 and C
′
i(qi) is strictly increasing at
all qi > 0.
C2-C3 and C5 are fairly standard. Assumption C1 captures the homogeneity of the product.
The logic of the first part concerns direct demand at firm j. Consumers initially go to the
firm with the lowest price and may only visit higher-priced firms when the lowest-price firms
produce strictly below their demand. The logic of the second part concerns indirect demand
at firm j. Indirect demand at firm j cannot exceed excess demand at firm i. Finally, C4
states that, when all firms produce at most their demand, then a firm cannot lose too much
of its demand when it increases its price slightly. The logic is that, once consumers cannot
buy at other suppliers, most of them would accept a limited price increase. Violation of this
principle could only be established by a sudden drastic drop in total demand.
Theorem 4. Under C1-C5, there exists no equilibrium.
Proof Suppose that p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p∗n) and q∗ = (q∗1, . . . , q∗n) is an equilibrium. We proceed
in six steps to derive a contradiction.
Step 1. For all i ∈ N , q∗i = Di(p∗, q∗−i).
By Lemma 1, q∗j ≤ Dj(p∗, q∗−j) for all j. Suppose that q∗i < Di(p∗, q∗−i). Since q∗j ≤ Dj(p∗, q∗−j)
for all j, by assumptions C2 and C4, Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i) is right-continuous at p
∗
i . So, firm i can
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improve its payoff by raising the price slightly, keeping production at the same level, and still
selling the same amount q∗i as at p
∗
i .
Step 2. For all i ∈ N , Πi(p∗, q∗) > 0.
Consider firm i and (p∗−i, q
∗
−i). It suffices to show that there is a price-quantity pair (pi, qi)
for which firm i’s profits are strictly positive.
Suppose p∗i = 0. Then profits for firm i are at most zero. By Step 1 and C4 we know that
Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(pi) is right-continuous at p
∗
i = 0. Since Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(0) > 0 by C3, there is pi > 0
with Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(pi) > 0. So, by C5, for sufficiently small qi, profits for firm i are strictly
positive. Contradiction.
So, p∗j > 0 for all j. Then, for firm i, by C3 there is pi > 0 with Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(pi) > 0. So,
again by C5, for sufficiently small qi, profits for firm i are strictly positive.
Step 3. For each two firms i, j ∈ N , p∗i = p∗j = P ∗.
Consider two firms, i and j, and suppose that p∗j > p
∗
i . By Step 1, we know that q
∗
i =
Di(p
∗, q∗−i). It then follows from C1 that Dj(p
∗, q∗−j) = 0, which implies that firm j’s profits
are at most zero. This contradicts Step 2. We conclude that p∗i = P
∗, ∀i ∈ N .
Step 4. For all i ∈ N , P ∗ ≥ C ′i(q∗i ).
Consider firm i. Given price P ∗, q∗i solves
maxqi P
∗ · qi − Ci(qi)
s.t.
0 ≤ qi ≤ Di(p∗, q∗−i).
As the objective function is strictly concave in qi, we either have that q
∗
i < Di(p
∗, q∗−i) and
P ∗ = C ′i(q
∗
i ) or q
∗
i = Di(p
∗, q∗−i) and P
∗ ≥ C ′i(q∗i ). By Step 1, we know that q∗i = Di(p∗, q∗−i)
and therefore P ∗ ≥ C ′i(q∗i ), ∀i ∈ N .
Step 5. For all i ∈ N , P ∗ 6= C ′i(q∗i ).
Consider firm i and suppose that P ∗ = C ′i(q
∗
i ). Following Step 1, we can choose ε > 0 and
K > 0 such that C4 holds. Take L > K and consider the following optimization problem:
max pi · qi − Ci(qi)
s.t.
qi = Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(P
∗)− L · (pi − P ∗)
and
pi ≥ P ∗.
Using Lagrange optimization, we find that for an optimal price-quantity pair (pi, qi) it holds
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that
pi = C
′
i(qi) +
qi
L
.
Clearly, if qi > q
∗
i , then pi > p
∗
i . Moreover, by choosing a qi > q
∗
i sufficiently close to q
∗
i as
well as a sufficiently large L, we can ensure that
pi = C
′
i(qi) +
qi
L
< C ′i(q
∗
i ) +
ε
2
+
qi
L
< p∗i + ε.
Thus, at (pi, qi) profits are strictly higher than at (P
∗, q∗i ) provided that firm i sells the entire
quantity of output qi.
Finally, following our choice of ε and K,
Zi(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i)(pi) ≥ Zi(p∗−i, q∗−i)(P ∗)−K · (pi − P ∗) > Zi(p∗−i, q∗−i)(P ∗)− L · (pi − P ∗) = qi.
Hence, firm i will indeed sell qi. We conclude that P
∗ 6= C ′i(q∗i ), ∀i ∈ N .
Step 6. For all i ∈ N , P ∗ ≤ C ′i(q∗i ).
Consider firm i and suppose that P ∗ > C ′i(q
∗
i ). We construct p
′
i and q
′
i such that Πi(p
′, q′) >
Πi(p
∗, q∗), where p′ = (p′i, p
∗
−i) and q
′ = (q′i, q
∗
−i).
We first define q′i. Consider a price pi < p
∗
i . Following Step 1 and 3, we can apply C2 so that
for every j 6= i,
Di(pi, p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i) ≥ Di(p∗, q∗−i) +Dj(p∗, q∗−j).
Take any firm j 6= i. By Step 2, we know that Dj(p∗, q∗−j) > 0. Now define A = Dj(p∗, q∗−j).
By C5, Ci(qi) is continuous. Thus, we can take q
′
i > q
∗
i such that C
′
i(q
′
i) < P
∗ and q′i <
Di(p
∗, q∗−i) +A.
Next, we define p′i. Given p
∗
i , define the function
Fi(qi) = p
∗
i · qi − Ci(qi).
By C5, Fi is strictly concave, Fi ≥ 0 and Fi(0) = 0. So, Fi is increasing as long as P ∗ > dCidqi (qi).
Since q′i > q
∗
i , and still
dCi
dqi
(q′i) < P
∗, it follows that
Fi(q
′
i) > Fi(p
∗
i ).
Now notice that the expression
pi · q′i − Ci(q′i).
converges to p∗i · q′i − Ci(q′i) = Fi(q′i) as pi converges to p∗i . So, we can choose p′i < p∗i with
p′i · q′i − Ci(q′i) > Fi(p∗).
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Now let firm i charge price p′i and produce quantity q
′
i. Write p
′ = (p∗−i, p
′
i). We show that
Πi(p
′, q′) > Πi(p∗, q∗).
Notice that
Di(p
′, q′−i) = Di(p
∗
−i, q
∗
−i, p
′
i) ≥ Di(p∗, q∗−i) +A > q′i.
So, q′i < Di(p
′, q′−i). It follows that
Πi(p
′, q′) = p′i · q′i − Ci(q′i) > Fi(p∗) = Πi(p∗, q∗).
Hence, Πi(p
′, q′) > Πi(p∗, q∗).
Finally, combining Step 4, 5 and 6 yields a contradiction. 
We now somewhat strengthen our assumptions on costs. In the following, it is assumed that
Ci(qi) ≥ 0 is twice continuously differentiable and strictly convex. More precisely, for each
i ∈ N , we assume d2Ci
dq2i
≥ ξ for some ξ > 0.
Theorem 5. ∃α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all α < α¯ rationing equilibria exist.
Proof Consider a value P > 0 and firm i. Since we assume that d
2Ci
dq2i
≥ ξ for some ξ > 0,
we can compute qi(P ) > 0 such that
dCi
dqi
(qi(P )) = P .
Since D and all functions dCidqi are continuous, and D(0) > 0, we can find P
∗ with qi(P ∗) <
D(P ∗)
n for all i. Write q
∗
i = qi(P
∗). We argue that
(p∗, q∗) = (P ∗, . . . , P ∗, q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n)
is an equilibrium. Consider firm i and let the strategies of the other firms be as stated above.
We argue that (P ∗, q∗i ) is a best response.
We argue that (P ∗, q∗i ) is a best response among all responses (pi, qi) with pi ≤ P ∗. Suppose
pi ≤ P ∗. Also suppose that qi is a best choice given pi. We first argue that pi = dCidqi (qi).
The equation pi =
dCi
dqi
(qi) has a solution, say q
′
i. Notice that pi =
dCi
dqi
(q′i), P
∗ ≤ dCidqi (q∗i ),
and pi ≤ P ∗. So, dCidqi (q′i) ≤
dCi
dqi
(q∗i ). Thus, since
dCi
dqi
is strictly increasing, q′i ≤ q∗i . However,
q∗i = qi(P
∗) < D(P
∗)
n by construction. Thus, since D is strictly decreasing, also q
′
i <
D(P ∗)
n .
So, since the profit function Πi = pi · qi − Ci(qi) is concave in qi, the best choice for qi given
pi satisfies pi =
dCi
dqi
(qi).
Thus, in any best response pi with pi ≤ P ∗, it holds that pi = dCidqi (qi). So, effectively firm i
maximizes the function
Πi =
dCi
dqi
(qi) · qi − Ci(qi)
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with a first derivative of
dCi
dqi
+ qi · d
2Ci
dq2i
− dCi
dqi
= qi · d
2Ci
dq2i
.
This last expression is strictly positive. So, the profit function is strictly increasing in qi.
Thus, the optimal choice among all choices pi ≤ P ∗ is at pi = P ∗, with a corresponding
optimal quantity choice of q∗i .
Suppose pi > P . Let P0 be such that D(P0) = 0. We may assume that pi ≤ P0. Write
Π∗i = P
∗ · D(P
∗)
n
− Ci(q∗i ),
the profit for firm i when (p∗, q∗) is played. Also write Πi for the profit when firm i plays
(pi, qi) instead. Suppose that α <
Π∗i
P0·D(P ∗) . We argue that Πi < Π
∗
i .
When pi > P
∗, firm i has direct demand zero. So, Di(p, q) = Dsi (p, q−i) ≤ α ·D(pi). So, for
the resulting profit
Πi = pi ·Di(p, q−i)−Ci(qi) ≤ pi ·Di(p, q−i) ≤ P0 ·Di(p, q−i) ≤ P0 ·α ·D(pi) ≤ P0 ·α ·D(P ∗).
So, since α <
Π∗i
P0·D(P ∗) , we find that Πi ≤ Π∗i .
Finally, note that, for any choice of P ∗ as above, the corresponding quantity q∗i in the equilib-
rium is strictly less than the demand D(P
∗)
n for firm i. Hence, we find that rationing equilibria
exist in this model. 
Thus, there exist pure-strategy solutions provided that spillover demand is not too strong.
The logic behind this result is that none of the firms should have an incentive to elevate prices.
This is the case when a price increase would result in a sufficient drop of sales. In the context
of our model, this implies that α must be sufficiently small. The idea that a significant fall in
demand is required for the existence of equilibrium is at the heart of various known solutions
to the Edgeworth paradox.13
What is perhaps more surprising concerns the type of equilibrium. Indeed, there is an in-
teresting contrast with the pioneering work of Shubik (1955, 1960). Even though he did not
solve the Edgeworth paradox, he did establish the efficient point as the sole equilibrium can-
didate.14 In the efficient point, firms price at marginal cost and saturate the market. The
above result confirms the first requirement, i.e., firms indeed produce at a level where price
13See, among others, Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Dixon (1990, 1992). The underlying logic can already be
found in Shubik (1955, 1960). More recently, Tasna´di (1999) proves the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium
when demand is sufficiently elastic.
14See Theorem 2 in Shubik (1960, p. 100).
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equals marginal cost. Yet, it does not confirm that firms meet the forthcoming demand at the
price set. In fact, sellers satisfy only part of their customers in equilibrium. These shortages
imply that prices are too low to be efficient. The reason for firms not to increase their prices
is that this would lead to a significant drop in sales.
This is of course not to say that the efficient point is never an equilibrium. In fact, under the
assumption of identical technologies and zero spillover demand, there does exist a Bertrand
equilibrium with price equal to marginal cost. In accordance with Theorem 5, however, there
also still is a range of rationing equilibria.
Theorem 6. Assume α = 0 and Ci(qi) = C(qi), ∀i ∈ N . There exists a set of symmetric
equilibria. Precisely one of these equilibria is a Bertrand equilibrium. The remaining equilibria
are rationing equilibria.
Proof In this symmetric model, the equilibria
(p∗, q∗) = (P ∗, . . . , P ∗, q∗1, . . . , q
∗
n)
from Theorem 5 reduce to
(P ∗, . . . , P ∗, q∗, . . . , q∗).
In this form, q∗ ≤ D(P ∗)n . All equilibria with q∗ < D(P
∗)
n are rationing equilibria. The equi-
librium with q∗ = D(P
∗)
n is a Bertrand equilibrium. 
In contrast to the continuous demand case, Theorems 5 and 6 show that when demand is
discontinuous the degree of spillover demand plays a critical role in establishing existence.
When spillover demand is not too strong, firms have no incentive to put their focus on
indirect rather than direct demand. What could be reasons for such limited spillover? One
obvious possibility is that a substantial part of the unlucky customers may prefer to leave the
market after they have failed to obtain the product or service directly. We further suspect
that spillover demand will not endure in fairly stable markets. If we make the reasonable
assumption that time is valuable and transportation costly, then it is evidently suboptimal
for customers to repeatedly receive their product indirectly. Indirect demand is therefore
likely to diminish in cases where the same customers are served each period.15
The above results were derived under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale. Our
findings would be different with constant returns, although the underlying logic remains.
15This suggests that spillover demand is more likely to last when products are sold on a first-come-first-served
basis rather than under efficient rationing or any other situation where the same customers get the product.
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One notable difference with the case of decreasing returns is that, under the assumption that
firms choose to meet their demand when this yields zero economic profits, rationing equilibria
will not exist. This would leave Bertrand equilibria as the only potential solution. Results,
in this case, have more of an ‘all-or-nothing’ flavor. With hetereogeneous costs, it will be the
lowest-cost firm that serves the entire market. With identical cost functions, by contrast, an
equilibrium exists when there is no spillover demand (i.e., when α = 0). Note that this latter
outcome is equivalent to the traditional Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
5 Examples
Let us now illustrate our main findings with a few representative examples. In this section,
we present five cases; the first three of which deal with a differentiated duopoly. Example 1
serves to show how equilibrium prices and quantities can be derived in a well-known textbook
model. Example 2 illustrates how an equilibrium may fail to exist when demand is non-
differentiable (a violation of B1), whereas Example 3 shows that an equilibrium may still
exist when demand functions exhibit a kink. Specifically, Example 2 and 3 highlight how
(non-)existence of equilibrium depends critically on whether a firm’s spillover demand is a
function of its own selling price. The final two examples, Example 4 and 5, consider a
homogeneous good oligopoly with and without spillover demand.
5.1 Heterogeneous Products
EXAMPLE 1. (Bowley (1924)) In this first example, we examine a well-known representative
consumer model as introduced by Bowley (1924). The (quasi-linear) utility of consuming a
quantity s1 at a price p1 and a quantity s2 at price p2 is given by
U = α · (s1 + s2)− 1
2
· β · (s21 + 2θs1s2 + s22)− p1 · s1 − p2 · s2,
which is the gain from consumption
V = α · (s1 + s2)− 1
2
· β · (s21 + 2θs1s2 + s22)
minus the total expenditure of p1 ·s1 +p2 ·s2. The degree of differentiation is captured by the
differentiation (or ‘distance’) parameter θ ∈ [0, 1]. When θ = 1, goods are perfect substitutes,
whereas both goods are independent in demand when θ = 0. Notice that utility depends on
sales (si) and not on demand (Di) or production (qi). For simplicity, it is assumed in the
following that firms have common, constant marginal cost c > 0.
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To determine the utility-maximizing allocation of sales, take the first-order conditions with
respect to s1 and s2:
α− βs1 − βθs2 − p1 = 0,
α− βs2 − βθs1 − p2 = 0.
Rearranging gives the inverse demand function for both firms:
p1 = α− β · (s1 + θs2),
p2 = α− β · (s2 + θs1).
Thus, given prices p1 and p2, the representative consumer aims to acquire
s1 =
1
β · (1 + θ) ·
[
α− p1
1− θ +
θp2
1− θ
]
,
s2 =
1
β · (1 + θ) ·
[
α− p2
1− θ +
θp1
1− θ
]
.
Note that this model meets the requirements of A2 and B1-B3 provided that production is
not too expensive. It then follows from Theorem 3 that there is an equilibrium. Moreover, by
Lemma 2 we know that this equilibrium is a Bertrand equilibrium. Thus, Firm 1 maximizes
Π1 = (p1 − c) · 1
β · (1 + θ) ·
[
α− p1
1− θ +
θp2
1− θ
]
,
which yields the following corresponding best reply function:
p1 =
1
2
· [c+ (1− θ) · α+ θ · p2] .
Using symmetry and solving the resulting system of best response functions gives
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
c+ α · (1− θ)
2− θ and D1 = D2 = q
∗
1 = q
∗
2 =
α− c
β · (1 + θ) · (2− θ) .
Suppose, for instance, that α = 18, β = 23 , θ =
1
2 and Ci(qi) = 3qi for i = 1, 2. This gives
demand functions D1(p1, p2) = [18 − 2p1 + p2]+ and D2(p1, p2) = [18 − 2p2 + p1]+ and the
following equilibrium prices and quantities:
p∗1 = p
∗
2 =
c+ α · (1− θ)
2− θ = 8 and D1 = D2 = q
∗
1 = q
∗
2 =
α− c
β · (1 + θ) · (2− θ) = 10.
EXAMPLE 2. ((Almost) Friedman (1988)) Let us now use the previous specifications (i.e.,
α = 18, β = 23 , θ =
1
2 and c = 3) and extend the model by adding the possibility of complete
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spillover. Thus, firm demand comprises all competitors’ unserved customers. Demand for the
products of Firm 1 is then given by
D1(p1, p2, q2) =
{
[18− 2p1 + p2]+ if 18 + p1 − 2p2 ≤ q2,
[36− p1 − p2 − q2]+ if 18 + p1 − 2p2 > q2.
The demand function for Firm 2 is symmetric. Such a setting closely mimics the framework
of Friedman (1988) and the underlying logic for non-existence of equilibrium is comparable.16
To see that this demand specification does indeed not admit an equilibrium, first observe that
A1 and A2 still hold. Hence, Lemma 2 applies so that in equilibrium qi = Di, for i = 1, 2.
This implies D1 = [18− 2p1 + p2]+ and D2 = [18− 2p2 + p1]+. Note that this is precisely the
demand structure of Example 1 leaving p1 = p2 = 8 and q1 = q2 = 10 as the only equilibrium
candidate. Given that p2 = 8 and q2 = 10, the demand function of Firm 1 reduces to
D1(p1) =
{
[26− 2p1]+ if 2 + p1 ≤ 10,
[18− p1]+ if 2 + p1 > 10.
It can now be easily verified that (p1, q1) = (8, 10) is no longer a best reply. In fact, given
(p2, q2) = (8, 10), Firm 1 has an incentive to ‘generate spillover demand’ by hiking its price.
Specifically, it maximizes
Π1 = (p1 − 3) · [18− p1]+ ,
which reaches its maximum at p1 =
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2 . Thus, in this case, a best reply to (p2, q2) = (8, 10) is
no longer (p1, q1) = (8, 10), but (p1, q1) = (10.5, 7.5).
EXAMPLE 3. (Kinked Demand with a Solution) Following Friedman (1988) and the
previous example, it is tempting to conclude that no equilibrium can exist in models with
complete spillover. We will now present an example showing that such a conclusion would be
premature. We again use the above Bowley model and assume that c = 3, β = 1 and θ = 0
(i.e., both firms are (local) monopolists). Absent spillover, demand functions are
D1(p1) = α− p1,
D2(p2) = α− p2.
In this case, equilibrium prices and quantities are respectively given by p∗1 = p∗2 =
α+3
2 and
q∗1 = q∗2 =
α−3
2 .
16Formally, this setting does not fall within the class of models considered by Friedman (1988) as it allows
for strictly positive demand even when direct demand is zero. That is, for a sufficiently high price, demand of
a firm may consist exclusively of customers that visited the rival first. Unfortunately, we have been unable so
far to construct meaningful or tractable demand specifications that fully fit the Friedman (1988) context.
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In contrast, the demand functions with complete spillover are
D1(p1, p2, q2) = [α− p1]+ + [α− p2 − q2]+,
D2(p2, p1, q1) = [α− p2]+ + [α− p1 − q1]+.
By Lemma 2, we know that in equilibrium qi = Di, for i = 1, 2. Thus, actual spillover is
zero and therefore q∗1 = α − p∗1 and q∗2 = α − p∗2. We conclude that there is an equilibrium
with p∗1 = p∗2 =
α+3
2 and q
∗
1 = q
∗
2 =
α−3
2 , which is identical to the equilibrium absent spillover
demand.17
It is worth highlighting the difference with the previous example as in both cases the demand
function exhibits a kink. The fundamental distinction lies in ‘the nature of the kink’. In this
example, it is due to the production level of the rival. In particular, the indirect demand is
independent of the own selling price. In Example 2, by contrast, the indirect demand does
depend on the own price. In other words, the demand functions exhibit a kink in pi and it is
precisely this property that in Example 2 destroys the equilibrium.18
5.2 Homogeneous Products
EXAMPLE 4. (No Spillover) Let total demand be given by D(P ) = A − P , with A > 0.
Moreover, let Ci(qi) = q
2
i , for all i ∈ N . This is a symmetric model and a special case of the
model in Section 4 with α = 0. Let P ∗ be a price associated with a symmetric equilibrium.
As C ′i(qi) = 2 · qi, it must be true that q∗i = 12 · P ∗.
In equilibrium, it holds that q∗i ≤ D(P
∗)
n or
1
2 · P ∗ ≤ A−P
∗
n , which can be rearranged to
P ∗ ≤ 2An+2 . If P ∗ < 2An+2 , then the equilibrium is a rationing equilibrium. The equilibrium is
a Bertrand equilibrium when P ∗ = 2An+2 .
EXAMPLE 5. (Spillover) Consider the model of the previous example, but now with spillover
demand (i.e., α > 0). Let P1 := P and define recursively Pk+1 = min{pi | pi > Pk}. For each
k, write Nk = {i | pi = Pk} and let Qk =
∑
i∈Nk qi.
Demand is defined as follows. Let A1 = A and D
d(P ) = A1 − P . Suppose that Dk is defined
recursively and let Ak+1 = D
k(Pk) − Qk. Furthermore, Dk+1(P ) = α · Ak+1 − (P − Pk) for
Pk < P ≤ Pk+1. For all i ∈ Nk, demand is then given by D
k(pi)
|Nk| .
Consider the Bertrand equilibrium of Example 4 with P ∗ = 2An+2 and q
∗
i =
A
n+2 , for all
i ∈ N . This equilibrium was derived for α = 0. We now determine for which values of α this
17A similar result can be derived in the spatial model of Hotelling (1929). See Alger (1979, Theorem 3.1).
18It is furthermore noteworthy that assumption B1 may also be satisfied when customers take into account
other factors than price. For instance, when there are costs associated with queuing, buyers might approach
another supplier well before their most preferred choice (absent queuing costs) is sold out.
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equilibrium remains an equilibrium.
As before, cutting price will not lead to an increase in profits. For pi > P
∗, demand is given
by Ds(pi) = α ·A2 − (pi − P ∗), where
A2 = D
d(P1)−Q1 = D(P ∗)− (n− 1) ·A
n+ 2
= A− 2A
n+ 2
− (n− 1) ·A
n+ 2
=
A
n+ 2
.
Substituting in the demand function gives
Ds(pi) =
α ·A
n+ 2
− (pi − 2A
n+ 2
) =
(α+ 2) ·A
n+ 2
− pi.
The profit function is
Πi = pi · qi − q2i = (
(α+ 2) ·A
n+ 2
− pi) · (2pi − (α+ 2) ·A
n+ 2
),
which reaches its maximum at pi =
3
4 · (α+2)·An+2 . This price exceeds P ∗ = 2An+2 precisely when
3
4 · (α + 2) > 2 or α > 23 . This implies that the Bertrand equilibrium with P ∗ = 2An+2 and
q∗i =
A
n+2 , for all i ∈ N , remains an equilibrium as long as α ≤ 23 . The Bertrand equilibrium
is destroyed when α > 23 .
6 Concluding Remarks
Perhaps, one of the most well-known contributions to understanding the oligopoly problem
is Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). They have shown that price competition conditional on
choices of capacity may yield Cournot-like outcomes. This result assumes, among other
things, that each firm has full knowledge about all output decisions before deciding on price.
In this paper, we relaxed this requirement by considering games where firms pick prices and
production levels simultaneously. As an interesting contrast, this may yield Bertrand-like
outcomes. Additionally, there might exist equilibria in which firms serve only part of their
clientele. The latter can occur when products are perfect substitutes and cost functions
exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
Apart from the characterization of equilibria, our analysis also suggests that the non-existence
problem may not be as severe as is commonly thought. In particular, the absence of a pure-
strategy equilibrium in price-quantity games is not primarily driven by the assumption that
firms choose prices and quantities, but more by how cost and demand are modeled. Therefore,
if we are to better understand how price is determined in oligopolies, our focus should not
be on selecting the appropriate strategic variable. After all, in non-regulated markets firms
almost always choose both prices and quantities. Instead, the aim should be to deepen our
understanding of the foundations of cost and demand. We leave this issue for future research.
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